This paper presents concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under weak assumptions of irrelevance that are expressed using lower and upper expectations. The results build upon De Cooman and Miranda's recent inequalities and laws of large numbers. The proofs indicate connections between the theory of martingales and concepts of epistemic and regular irrelevance.
Introduction
In this paper we assume that a decision maker represents her uncertainty about a situation of interest through a set of expectation functionals. As each expectation functional induces a probability measure, our decision maker operates with a set of probability measures K instead of a single probability measure. There may be more than a single measure in K either because there are disagreements about the situation of interest, or because the decision maker is verifying the robustness of her assessments against perturbations, or because the decision maker has neither time nor resources to eliminate distributions from K. Perhaps the decision maker even wishes to abstract tedious details of the situation by not specifying point probabilities for some events. In any case, for each variable X we have its lower and upper expectations, respectively
where inf and sup are taken with respect to the set of expectation functionals. Similarly, for any event A, we have its lower and upper probabilities, respectively P (A) . = inf P (A) , P (A) . = sup P (A) ,
where P (A) is equal to the expectation of I A , the indicator function of A.
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The goal of this paper is to present concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers under weak assumptions of "irrelevance" that are appropriate for such a decision maker. To illustrate the kind of result we seek, consider that De Cooman and Miranda [5, Def. 1] have recently identified an assumption of irrelevance based on lower and upper expectations, called forward factorization, that leads to laws of large numbers such as:
for any > 0, lim
Note that weaker assumptions (basic model is a set of expectation functionals) lead to weaker conclusions (average stays within interval). Inequalities and laws presented later are similar to these previous seminal results. Section 2 presents some basic concepts. Section 3 considers several assumptions of irrelevance for sets of variables. Section 4 presents results for bounded variables. Regarding bounded variables the contribution here, when compared to De Cooman and Miranda's work, lies in offering tighter inequalities and alternative proof techniques that are closely related to established methods in standard probability theory (in particular, close to the Hoeffding and the Azuma inequalities). Section 5 offers more significant contributions as we lift the assumption of boundedness for variables, and use martingale theory to prove laws of large numbers under countable additivity. Section 6 explains the validity of results in Section 4 for full conditional measures and for Walley's theory of lower previsions. Section 7 comments on the significance of results.
Sets of expectations and probabilities, conditioning and irrelevance
Throughout the paper we assume that an expectation functional E maps variables into real numbers, and satisfies:
where X, Y are variables and α, β are real numbers (inequalities are understood pointwise). From such an expectation functional E, a finitely additive probability measure P is induced by P (A) . = E[I A ] for any event A with indicator function I A (an event is a subset of the possibility space Ω). We sometimes denote the indicator function of event A simply by A. A finitely additive probability measure defined on the field of all subsets of Ω completely characterizes an expectation functional on bounded functions and vice-versa [32, Thm. 3.2.2] . An important property of expectation functionals is that if a sequence of bounded variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . is such that lim j→∞ sup |X j − X| = 0 for some variable X, then [32, Sec. 2.6.
A set of probability measures induced by a set of expectation functionals is called a credal set [23] . We do not assume that a credal set must be convex, nor closed, nor connected; an axiomatization of such general credal sets from preferences has been proposed by Seidenfeld et al [29] . Given a credal set K, lower and upper expectations can be written respectively as E [X] .
. Lower and upper probabilities are similarly written as P (A) . = inf P ∈K P (A) and P (A) . = sup P ∈K P (A).
Countable additivity
Countable additivity is an assumption of continuity; for expectation functionals it reads [35, Sec. 2.2]: if X 1 , X 2 , . . . increase monotonically to a limit X,
For a probability measure, countable additivity means: if A 1 ⊃ A 2 ⊃ . . . is a countable sequence of events such that ∩ i A i = ∅, then lim n→∞ P (A n ) = 0. For a credal set, countable additivity means that given a countable sequence of events
(hence, lim n→∞ P (A n ) = 0 for every probability measure in the credal set; that is, every probability measure in the credal set satisfies countable additivity). Countable additivity is assumed in the remainder of this section and in Sections 3, 4 and 5. Whenever countable additivity is assumed, we assume that variables are measurable and all measures in the credal set of interest are specified using the same σ-field (so that sup P E P [X|Y ] is measurable). Countable additivity is not assumed in Section 6.
Conditioning
The conditional expectation for variable X given a nonempty event A, denoted by E[X|A], is constrained by E[X|A] P (A) = E[XA]. The "standard" approach to conditioning is to define E[X|A] as E[XA] /P (A) when P (A) > 0, and to leave E[X|A] undefined when P (A) = 0. If we have two random variables X and Y , the standard (Kolmogorovian) approach to conditioning takes E[X|Y ] to be a random variable that solves the following equation for every B in the σ-algebra generated by Y [25, Sec. B.1.2]:
The Radon-Nikodym theorem guarantees, given the assumption of countable additivity in the standard theory, existence of E[X|Y ], unique up to probability zero changes. Moreover, the following disintegrability result holds:
To motivate some of the definitions proposed in the next section, consider the definition of conditional upper expectations when we have a set K of expectation functionals. It might seem reasonable to define conditional upper expectations as follows:
and likewise for conditional lower expectations; that is, E [X|A] is equal to inf E[X|A] if P (A) > 0 and undefined otherwise. This sort of conditioning appears in theories that ignore events of lower probability zero, such as Giron and Rios' theory [16] ; later we indicate that this definition does not seem to lead to interesting laws of large numbers. A possibly more sensible idea, that we indicate through the superscript >, is to discard those distributions for which P (A) = 0 [33, 34] :
and likewise for conditional lower expectations; that is, E > [X|A] is equal to inf E∈K:P(A)>0 E[X|A] if P (A) > 0 and undefined otherwise. We refer to this strategy as regular conditioning, inspired by Walley [32, Ap. J], who uses the term regular extension for a similar idea. Appendix A further comments on regular conditioning.
Irrelevance
Suppose we have a set of probability measures and two variables X and Y . Walley defines epistemic irrelevance of Y to X to mean that
for all bounded functions f of X (Section 6 further comments on Walley's theory). One might take epistemic irrelevance as a relaxed version of stochastic independence, perhaps suitable for robustness analysis, or as the appropriate definition of irrelevance in the presence of disagreeing, incomplete or imprecise assessments of probability. Note that epistemic irrelevance is much weaker than requiring that each expectation functional satisfies standard stochastic independence of X and Y . Because Walley's concept requires a theory of conditioning that departs from the standard one (Section 6), we present here a modified concept of irrelevance that employs the intuition behind regular conditioning. Assume countable additivity and suppose all measures of interest are specified using the same σ-field; further assume that for each expectation functional E, the conditional expectation E[·|Y ] is a random variable obtained through the standard approach to conditioning. In rough terms, our approach is to associate with each probability measure P in the credal set an event N P such that P (N P ) = 0, and to require that for all functions f of X,
We start with some preliminary definitions. Given a credal set K, an exclusion set N is a set containing an event N P for each probability measure P in K, such that P (N P ) = 0. Define the random variable E > N [X|Y ] as follows:
α to indicate inequalities that hold for y such that {P : y ∈ N P } = ∅. Finally:
for every function f of X and for some exclusion set N.
Under countable additivity and standard conditioning (Expression (3)), regular irrelevance of Y to X implies
for any function f of X and for any event A(Y ) defined by variable Y such that P (A(Y )) > 0. Throughout the paper the expression "event A(Y ) defined by variable Y " means that A has an indicator function that is a zero/one function of Y .
Irrelevance assumptions and factorizations
We now introduce the main irrelevance assumptions for sets of random variables. To simplify the notation, a set of variables {X 1 , . . . , X n } is denoted by X 1:n . Later we refer to infinitely long sequences of variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . ; all concepts of irrelevance apply to an infinite sequence if they apply to every subsequence X 1:n .
Forward regular irrelevance and weak forward regular irrelevance
Our starting point is De Cooman and Miranda's assumption of forward irrelevance [5, 6] for random variables X 1:n :
We adapt their assumption to the definition of regular irrelevance, and define forward regular irrelevance as follows:
• for each i ∈ [2, n], there is an exclusion set N such that for any function
A weaker condition, that we refer to as weak forward regular irrelevance, follows the intuition behind Expression (6):
• for each i ∈ [2, n], there is an exclusion set N such that
Another variant of forward irrelevance, now based on the intuition behind Expression (4), is:
This latter condition is really too weak to produce any sensible law of large numbers, as the following example demonstrates. 1 For this reason, we do not deal with Condition (11) further in this paper.
Example 1 Consider binary variables
Consider a convex and closed set K of joint distributions built as the convex hull of three distributions P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , as follows.
Distribution P 1 simply assigns probability one to A 1 . Distribution P 2 assigns probability δ to A 0 and probability 1 − δ to A 1 , for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Distribution P 3 is the product of identical marginals: for any integer n > 0,
For the convex hull of P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , Expression (11) is satisfied. This conclusion is reached by analyzing each distribution in turn. Note that lower and upper expectations for any function of a binary variable X are linearly related to lower and upper probabilities of the event {X = 1}; consequently, in this example it is enough to consider upper and lower probabilities.
For distribution P 1 , P 1 (X i = 1) = 1 and for any i > 1 we have P 1 (X i = 1|A(X 1:i−1 )) = 1 whenever P (A(X 1:i−1 )) > 0. Note that for any event A(X 1:i−1 ): if A 1 ∈ A, then P 1 (A) = 1; if A 1 ∈ A, then P 1 (A) = 0. For distribution P 2 , P 2 (X i = 1) = 1 − δ for any i > 0. Additionally, for any event A(X 1:i−1 ) we have P 2 (X i = 1|A(X 1:i−1 )) either equal to 1 − δ or 1 whenever P (A) > 0: if A 1 ∈ A, then P (A) = 0 (due to P 1 ); so suppose A 1 ∈ A, and note that if A 0 ∈ A, then P 2 (X i = 1|A) = 1 − δ, and if A 0 ∈ A, then P 2 (X i = 1|A) = 1. For distribution P 3 , we have P 3 (X i = 1) = 1 − δ and for any i > 1 we have P 3 (X i = 1|A(X 1:i−1 )) = 1 − δ for any nonempty event A(X 1:i−1 ). Hence we have P (X i = 1) = P (X i = 1|A(X 1:i−1 )) = 1 − δ and
The weak law of larger numbers fails because, for any ∈ (0, 1 − δ),
This follows from the fact that, for any integer n > 0,
Forward factorization
De Cooman and Miranda have introduced a condition called forward factorization for variables X 1:n that leads to interesting laws of large numbers [5, Def. 1]. Forward factorization requires:
• for each i ∈ [2, n], for any bounded function f of X i and any non-negative bounded function g of X 1:i−1 ,
The second part of the next proposition conveys a possibly more intuitive characterization of forward factorization: Proposition 1 Forward factorization for variables X 1:n is equivalent both to
• for each i ∈ [2, n], for any bounded function f of X i and any event A defined by variables X 1:i−1 ,
and to
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix B. The proof only assumes finite additivity. Note that under countable additivity and standard conditioning (Expression (3)), forward regular irrelevance implies forward factorization.
Forward factorization implies a valuable inequality that is used in Section 4:
Proposition 2 For bounded and nonnegative functions f i , forward factorization of X 1:n implies
The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix C.
Bounded variables
Take variables X 1 , . . . , X n such that sup
The following inequalities, proved under several assumptions in theorems to be presented, are counterparts of Hoeffding inequality [9, 18] :
These concentration inequalities are similar to, but slightly tighter than, inequalities by De Cooman and Miranda [5, Remark 2] . Note that results in this section are proved under the assumption of countable additivity and definitions of conditioning and irrelevance presented earlier, while De Cooman and Miranda adopt Walley's theory; the matter is discussed in more detail in Section 6. The next theorem assumes a factorization that is implied by forward regular irrelevance (or by forward factorization); its proof, presented in Appendix D, is remarkably similar to usual proofs of the Hoeffding inequality [9] .
Theorem 1 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy Expression (13) for bounded and nonnegative functions (14) and (15) hold.
Theorem 1 leads to simple proofs of laws of large numbers stated by De Cooman and Miranda [5] . The proof of the following theorem is presented in Appendix E. The third expression in the theorem corresponds to a finitary version of the usual strong law of large numbers [10] ; because countable additivity is assumed, limits can be taken (as in the last two expressions of Theorem 4).
In the next theorem and later we use
Theorem 2 If bounded variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . are such that X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy Expressions (14) and (15) for any n > 1, then for any > 0,
where n, N and N denote positive integers.
Corollary 1 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . satisfy forward regular irrelevance or forward factorization. Then, for any > 0, the three expressions in Theorem 2 hold.
We move to weak forward regular irrelevance and obtain an analogue of the Azuma inequality [1, 8] . It is interesting to note that the proof of the following theorem, presented in Appendix F, is remarkably similar to the usual proof of the original Azuma inequality [1] . In Section 6 we comment on the similarities between the next two theorems and results by De Cooman and Miranda [5, Sec.
4.1].
Theorem 3 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy weak forward regular irrelevance. If (14) and (15) hold.
We now present laws of large numbers under weak forward regular irrelevance, that follow directly from Theorems 2 and 3. De Cooman and Miranda prove a similar pair of laws by resorting to their theory of forward irrelevant natural extensions [5, Sec. 4.1]; again, recall that their results do not assume countable additivity, as discussed in Section 6.
Corollary 2 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . satisfy weak forward regular irrelevance. Then, for any > 0, the three expressions in Theorem 2 hold.
Laws of large numbers without boundedness
We now consider variables without bounds in their ranges under the assumption of weak forward regular irrelevance; the resulting laws of large numbers are the main contribution of the paper. In this section we again assume that countable additivity holds (Expression (2) ; that is, countable additivity of each element P of the credal set). We also assume, again, that standard (Kolmogorovian) conditioning is adopted. Thus our setup is close to the standard one; we only depart from the Kolmogorovian tradition in explicitly letting a set of expectation functionals to be permissible given a set of assessments.
The proof employs a sequence of variables {Y n } defined as follows, for a fixed P :
The key observation is that {Y n } is a martingale with respect to P . The properties of this martingale are explored in the proof of the next theorem, presented in Appendix G. 
, and the variance of any X i with respect to any element P of the credal set is no larger than a finite quantity σ 2 . Then, for any > 0,
where n, N and N denote positive integers. Consequently,
One final question is whether it is possible to remove the condition that variances must be finite in this theorem. Even in the standard theory one finds that laws of large numbers fail if restrictions on variances are simply removed [15] . Typically when restrictions on variances are removed one requires variables to be identically distributed [14, 24] . In our setting the most natural requirement would be to ask all credal sets containing marginal distributions to be identical. This is the situation where, as Epstein and Schneider aptly call, variables are independent and indistinguishably distributed [13, Eq. 2.2]. Alas, the following example shows that this assumption of indistinguishability fails to substitute for restrictions on variances.
Example 2 Assume countable additivity. Consider integer-valued random variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . that satisfy forward factorization. The only available assessment is E[X i ] = E[X i ] = 0 for every X i (all marginal credal sets are identical). Now consider a joint distribution P that satisfies all assessments and irrelevances: P is the product measure of P i defined as:
< ∞ for every joint distribution, and then the Borel-Cantelli lemma guarantees that the differences are negligible). Consequently, the behavior of the original sequence can be investigated, possibly using Theorem 4, by studying the truncated sequence {X i I |Xi|≤i }. The extent to which such techniques can lead to conceptually interesting results is yet to be understood, given that the assumption of identical marginals for each joint distribution seems to clash in spirit with regular irrelevance and the factorization conditions studied in this paper.
Finding a condition that is both stronger than indistinguishability and more intuitive than assuming identical marginals for every joint distribution, and that still leads to laws of large numbers, is an open problem.
A comment on Walley's theory of lower previsions
The work by De Cooman and Miranda on laws of large numbers adopts Walley's theory of lower previsions [5] , and focus on bounded variables. We now comment on the extent to which results in Section 4 apply to Walley's theory; to do so, we first review basic facts about full conditional measures.
The theory of full conditional measures, whose most vocal advocate was de Finetti [7] , offers an alternative to the standard (Kolmogorovian) theory. The idea is to take the conditional expectation E[X|A] as a primitive that is well defined even if the event A has zero probability. Three axioms are imposed on conditional expectations: for any nonempty event A,
If a function E[·|·] satisfies these axioms, we call it a full conditional expectation. We can then define a set-function P (B|A) . = E[I B |A] for any event B and any nonempty event A. Such P is usually called a full conditional measure [11, 21] , and it satisfies, for every nonempty event C: (1) P (C|C) = 1; (2) P (A|C) ≥ 0 for all A; (3) P (A ∪ B|C) = P (A|C) + P (B|C) for all disjoint A and B; (4) P (A ∩ B|C) = P (A|B ∩ C) P (B|C) for all A and B such that B ∩ C = ∅.
If we are dealing with full conditional expectations, then, given two variables X and Y , the expectation E[X|Y = y] is well defined for every y such that {Y = y} is nonempty. Given a set K of full conditional expectations, we can define lower and upper conditional expectations respectively as
for every y, without concern on whether P (Y = y) = 0 or not. Note that Radon-Nikodym derivatives do not always satisfy the axioms for full conditional measures when the conditioning event has probability zero [27, 28] ; hence there are substantial differences between full conditional measures and standard (Kolmogorovian-style) probability measures.
For a single expectation functional, disintegrability holds with respect to
for any X. Disintegrability may fail for a single finitely additive probability measure over an infinite space [7, 11] ; that is, there is a finitely additive probability measure P such that
There are that do not adopt countable additivity but still obtain disintegrability. The theories of coherent behavior by Heath and Sudderth [17] and by Lane and Sudderth [22] axiomatize the strategic measures of Dubins and Savage [12] , and prescribe probability measures that disintegrate appropriately along predefined partitions. It would be sufficient for our purposes to have sets of such strategic measures disintegrating over suitable partitions (note that despite the drawbacks of strategic measures [19] , they do admit non-trivial laws of large numbers [20] ).
For an upper expectation, define disintegrability with respect to Y to mean Also, we have that forward irrelevance leads to forward factorization and then to the laws of large numbers in Theorem 2 (this is proved by De Cooman and Miranda using a different strategy). To see this, note that using Walley's definition of epistemic irrelevance we have: if Y is epistemically irrelevant to X, then
for any function f of X and any event A(Y ) defined by Y such that P (A(Y )) > 0.
3 Thus forward irrelevance implies forward factorization, using Proposition 1, and this leads to the laws of large numbers.
Theorem 3 is more delicate as the use of elementwise disintegrability in the proof is not really meaningful in Walley's theory. However we can derive the result by assuming only disintegrability of upper expectations and the following condition, that adapts weak forward regular irrelevance to Walley's theory:
The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix H.
Theorem 5 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , . . . , X n satisfy the condition given by Expression (17) . Assume disintegrability of upper expectations with respect to X 1:i−1 for i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. (14) and (15) hold.
Using Theorems 2 and 5:
Corollary 3 Suppose bounded variables X 1 , X 2 , . . . satisfy the condition given by Expression (17) . Assume disintegrability of upper expectations with respect to X 1:n for n > 1. Then, for any > 0, the three expressions in Theorem 2 hold.
Discussion
The concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers proved in this paper assume rather weak conditions of irrelevance. When compared to usual laws of large numbers, both premises and consequences are weaker: expectations are not assumed precisely known, and convergence is interval-valued.
Inequalities (14) and (15), and related theorems, slightly sharpen results in De Cooman and Miranda's seminal work [5] . The proofs of these inequalities, as presented in this paper, are rather close to well-known methods in standard probability theory. It should be noted that De Cooman and Miranda already comment on the similarity between their inequalities and Hoeffding's. Note also that De Cooman and Miranda's results generalize several previous efforts, such as by Epstein and Schneider, where credal sets are convex and closed and satisfy a condition of supermodularity [13, Sec. 4] .
Theorem 4 is possibly the most valuable contribution of this paper. The strategy of the proof is to translate weak assumptions of irrelevance into facts regarding martingales, and to adapt results for martingales to this setting. This strategy keeps the proof close to well-known results in probability theory. The connection between lower and upper expectations and the theory of martingales seems rather natural [4, 30] , but the relationship between epistemic/regular irrelevance and martingales does not appear to have been explored in depth so far. We note that the basic constraint defining martingales (that is, E[Y n |X 1:n−1 ] = Y n−1 ) is preserved by convex combination of distributions; therefore, the study of martingales seems appropriate when one deals with convex sets of probability distributions -certainly it seems less contorted than the analysis through stochastic independence, as stochastic independence is not preserved by convex combination.
There are some open questions that call for study. First, it would be valuable to determine whether countable additivity (or at least disintegrability assumptions) are really needed in Theorems 3 and 4. Another question is whether the condition on variances in Theorem 4 can be replaced by some weaker condition; this prompts the question of whether there is some interesting notion of "identically distributed" variables in the present setting.
A. Regular conditioning
Using an earlier proposal by Walley himself [31, Sec. 7] , we can define regular conditioning without any reference to individual probability measures:
Proof. We have:
B. Proof of Proposition 1
We divide the proof in two steps.
Lemma 2 Forward factorization for variables X 1:n is equivalent to: for each i ∈ [2, n], for any bounded function f of X i and any event A defined by variables
Proof. If condition (12) holds, then by selecting g(X 1:i−1 ) = A(X 1:i−1 ) we obtain Expression (19) . Now assume conversely that Expression (19) holds. For a fixed i, define Y = g(X 1:i−1 ) and construct a sequence of simple functions indexed by j ≥ 1:
where, for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 2 j + 1}, A j,k is the indicator function of
For any P of interest, Expression (19) implies 
. Consequently, using Expression (1),
Proof. Denote f (X i ) by X and A(X 1:i−1 ) by A. Using Lemma 2 and Expression (18) , it is enough to show that E A(X − E[X]) ≤ 0 is equivalent to inf(α :
C. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For any X, Y , we have
≤ 0 (using Expression (12)).
. We obtain the desired result by iterating this reasoning. 2
D. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. If X ≥ 0, then I {X≥ } ≤ X/ for any > 0; using the fact that if
Using this inequality and Proposition 2:
We now use the variant of Hoeffding's result given by Expression (23): If variable
where the last inequality is obtained by taking s = 4 /γ n . This proves the first inequality in the theorem; the second inequality is proved by considering the upper probability P
E. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Define β 2 . = max i β 2 i . Noting that P (A) = 1 − P (A c ) for any event A, using subadditivity of upper probability, and then Expressions (14) and (15):
By taking the limit as n grows without bound, we obtain that the lower probability goes to one. Now consider the strong law of large numbers. For any > 0, N > 0 and N > 0,
Consequently,
). An analogous argument leads to
By superadditivity of upper probability: for any > 0, there is N such that for any N ,
F. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Using both Markov's inequality (as in the proof of Theorem 1) and elementwise disintegrability, for any s > 0,
where h P (X 1:n−1 ) = E P exp s(X n − E[X n ]) | X 1:n−1 . Due to weak forward regular irrelevance:
whenever the event defined by X 1:n−1 has nonzero probability with respect to P . For these events we now apply Expression (23); other events have probability zero and do not matter when the outer expectation is calculated. So, for events of interest,
We apply Expression (23) to P in conditional form (that is: if variable X satisfies a ≤ X ≤ b and
Given this inequality,
These inequalities can be iterated to produce:
Finally, by selecting s = 4 /γ n ,
The second inequality in the theorem is proved by noting that weak forward factorization of X 1 , . . . , X n implies weak forward factorization of −X 1 , .
, and by focusing on P
G. Proof of Theorem 4
As noted before the statement of Theorem 4, we use the sequence {Y n } defined as
This sequence is a function of all variables X 1:n such that
so, {Y n } is a martingale with respect to P . We now manipulate a number of standard conditional expectations, where the conditioning events that have positive probability with respect to P are the ones that matter. We have:
And by taking expectations on both sides we obtain the following martingale property (note the use of elementwise disintegrability):
Elementwise disintegrability also leads to
Proof. We start with Expression (21) for a fixed P .
Iterating the last expression, and denoting
using weak forward regular irrelevance to conclude that ∆ 2 i ≤ δ 2 .
4
After these preliminaries on the sequence {Y n }, note that for any > 0,
using weak forward regular irrelevance. The last expression is equal to
By Chebyshev's inequality and Expression (22),
By combining these inequalities for any P of interest, the first inequality in the theorem is proved. By taking the limit as n grows without bound, we obtain
The proof of the strong law of large numbers uses the same strategy, but replaces the appeal to Chebyshev's inequality by an appeal to the KolmogorovHajek-Renyi inequality (Expression (24)), as in the proof of the strong law of large numbers by Whittle [35, Thm. 14.2.3] . So, for a fixed P and for any > 0, we proceed as previously to obtain:
4 A reviewer generously suggested a derivation that shows E PˆY 2 n˜≤ nσ 2 , thus obtaining a sharper inequality and removing the need for δ. The strategy is to recall that the set of square-integrable functions is an Hilbert space; hence E P [·|X 1:n ] is the orthogonal projection onto the set of square-integrable X 1:n -measurable functions. Consequently, from the properties of Hilbert spaces,
As {0, Y N , Y N +1 , . . . , Y N +N } forms a martingale, we use the Kolmogorov-HajekRenyi inequality (Expression (24)) to produce:
Hence:
Consequently, for integer N > (σ 2 + δ 2 )/ 3 , we obtain the desired inequality
Using the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi without an upper bound on n,
This is almost exactly the inequality obtained by De Cooman and Miranda [5, Thm. 7] for bounded variables. We now copy their reasoning [5, A.8 ] to obtain probabilities over lim sup and lim inf. Event Λ = {ω : lim sup n (1/n)
Using countable additivity, P (Λ) = inf m≥1 inf N ≥1 P (∪ n≥N Λ m,n ) for every P . And using the previous inequality, for every m there is some N * ≥ 1 such that
2/m = 0;
consequently, P (Λ) = 0 for any P of interest, as desired. The last expression in the theorem is proved from P ∀n ≥ N :
by a similar argument. 2
H. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Using both Markov's inequality (as in the proof of Theorem 1) and disintegrability, for any s > 0 we get We have reached an analog of Expression (20) , and the proof of the theorem can be produced by copying the steps after that expression. 2
I. Two auxiliary inequalities
The following inequality is a simple extension of a basic result by Hoeffding [9, 18] We now review the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequality, almost exactly as proved by Whittle [35, Thm. 14.2.2]; this is presented just to indicate the role of elementwise disintegrability in the derivation. Let {X i } be a martingale with X 0 = 0, and let { i } be a sequence 0 < 1 ≤ 2 ≤ . . . ; the inequality is
Proof. Define 0 . = 1 and A n . = {∀j ∈ [0, n] : |X j | < j }. Using ξ i = X i − X i−1 , and denoting the indicator function of some events by the events themselves, 
Iteration of the last inequality yields the result. Note that disintegrability for each P was used when applying the martingale property. 2
It should be noted that the inequality proved by Whittle is slightly different: P (∀j ∈ [1, n] :
i (under the same conditions). The proof only changes by replacing indicator functions (I {|X|< } by I {|X|≤ } ).
